A party is dominant if there is a majority coalition to which that party belongs such that it affords this party more possibilities to form an alternative winning coalition than any of the other members of the coalition (see Peleg [1980, 1981]).
Introduction
There are different criteria for measuring the quality of a political system. In this paper I argue that one of desired properties of a multi-party system is the existence of one party that is "stronger" than any of the others. If such a party exists, it may improve the governability of the political system. Applying the game-theory concept of a dominant player (see Peleg [1980 Peleg [ , 1981 ) to define a "strong" party, a formal definition is given in Section 2, but for now the property is described informally.
There is a number of parties in a parliament. Suppose that party i, together with a coalition of parties S, forms a majority in the parliament. Suppose also that i has at least one another alternative to form a majority, for instance, to join coalition S (no member of S belongs to S , and together S and S have no majority). However, if S can form a majority without party i, for example, together with coalition T , then also when i joins T , it obtains the majority. When the above holds, i is a dominant party, and it dominates the coalition {i} ∪ S. Intuitively, party i has more freedom to form a majority coalition without its partners in S while members of S have fewer possibilities to form a majority. In this sense i is stronger than the other parties. It has been proven by Peleg [1981] that if only a simple majority is required, there exists at most one party with such a property in a parliament (see Proposition 2.7).
A special case of a dominant party is a party which has a majority of seats in parliament and therefore, does not need any other party to form a majority coalition. In this paper such a party is called a "dictator". Obviously, the existence of a dictator improves the governability of the political system. On the other hand, if a dictator party exists, the ability of other parties to influence the outcome of political decision-making vanishes.
It may be suggested that an optimal allocation of seats in a parliament is one in which one party is stronger than all the others (in terms of this paper, it is called dominant), but it is not strong enough to be a dictator.
Using empirical data about the allocation of seats in parliaments from 15 countries (see Appendix 1 for a description of the data), I found that out of 336 observations (compositions of parliaments), 257 had a dominant party while only 32 had a dictator.
My claim is that this frequency of dominated parties is significantly high and that the frequency of dictator parties is significantly low. The following statistical test is used (see Section 3 for a detailed description). For every observation I assume that parties represented in parliament are the only political actors; that is, parties that do not obtain any seats in parliament can be ignored. Let seats be allocated to those parties randomly, where all compositions of parliaments are equally likely. The probability that there is a dominant party or that there is a dictator is computed. After repeating this procedure 336 times, for each real-data observation, I found that the probability of randomly obtaining 257 or more parliaments containing a dominant party, or obtaining 32 or less parliaments containing a dictator, is negligibly low. Thus, a distribution of parliament compositions, at least in the data sample used, is biased toward the high frequency occurrence of a dominant party and the low frequency occurrence of a dictator.
It may be interesting to perform the analysis described above by each one of countries. Unfortunately, a number of elections in most countries is not too high to provide a sufficiently large sample for statistical analysis. Nevertheless, if only countries with number of observations above 20 are considered, significant results similar to the general (cross-country) one are obtained for the Netherlands, for Denmark and for Switzerland.
The question of government coalition formation is widely discussed in the literature (see Riker [1962 ], de Swaan [1973 , Axelrod [1970] , Lijphart [2012, Chapter 6] and Chua and Felsenthal [2008] ). I suggest that the strength of parties, in the game-theoretic sense, is one of factors in the formation of coalitions.
Suppose that a dominant party exists. First, in my data sample, in 305 out of 367 cases the dominant party is chosen to form a cabinet. But this finding is not significant since the dominant party has to be the largest one (Peleg [1981] ). Therefore, it is not clear if it was chosen to form a cabinet because of its being a dominant party or because of its size. Next we take into account only parliamentary compositions and cabinet coalitions where a dominant party exists and it is not a dictator and it forms the coalition and the cabinet coalition has the majority. By definition, a party is dominant if there is a coalition that it dominates, and the party forms the majority by joining that coalition.
But will the dominant party actually use its theoretical advantage to form a coalition that it dominates? I found that out of the 129 cabinet coalitions in the dataset 90 were dominated. If coalitions are chosen randomly with a uniform distribution, out of all majority coalitions including dominant parties, the probability of obtaining 90 or more dominated coalitions is close to zero. This supports the hypothesis that if a dominant party forms a majority coalition, with a significantly high frequency it tends to chose a coalition that it dominates. See Section 4 for a detailed description.
How is frequency of a dominant party related to the number of parties in a parliament?
The intuitive answer is not unequivocal. On the one hand, if the number of parties decreases one can expect that the relative size of the largest party will increase and so will the probability that it is dominant. On the other hand, when the number of parties increases, the number of possible coalitions also increases, so it may be expected that the probability that the largest party is dominant increases. Statistical analysis of the data (Section 5) provides evidence that if the number of parties is relatively low, the frequency of a dominant party increases with the number of parties. While I conjecture that this property does not hold for a sufficiently high number of parties, there is not enough data to give it support.
Note that the definition of a dominant party is based on the whole composition of the parliament. That is the reason I use the number of parties as it was in a parliament.
Other measures of number of parties, like the "effective number" (Laakso and Taagepera [1979] ) can not be applied to this model. The notion of "dominant party" used in the political science literature has a different meaning than the one used here. I now discuss the relation between the two. Duverger [1959] in his classic text wrote: "What is a dominant party? First of all a party larger than any of the others and which heads the list and clearly out-distances its rivals over a certain period of time". Note that the "game-theory" definition of dominant party used in this work refers to a distribution of seats to parties at a single time, and not to any prolonged tendency. Duverger continues with a "softer" definition: "Every party that is larger than all the others over a certain period of time is not necessarily dominant .... A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch .... A dominant party is that which public opinion believes to be dominant". Similarly, Sartori [1976] argues that "Whenever we find, in a polity, a party that outdistances all the others, this party is dominant in that it is significantly stronger than all the others". Sartori also defines a predominant party as one which obtains a majority of seats in a number of sequential elections. This is a special case of what I have called a "dictator". Note that the definition of a dictator party does not require a majority in a number of parliaments. Pempel [1990] suggests a detailed list of conditions for being a dominant party in the Duverger-Sartori sense:
(C1) Dominant in number : it must win a larger number of seats than its opponents.
(C2) Dominant bargaining position: it must be in a strategic position that makes it highly unlikely for any government to be formed without its inclusion.
(C3) Dominant chronologically: it must be at the core of a nation's government over a substantial period of time.
(C4) Dominant governmentally: the dominant party carries out what many would call a historical project that gives a particular shape to the national political agenda.
Actually, an intuition of the "game-theory" definition of a dominant party used in this paper is compatible with (C2) when (C1) is obtained as a result following from the dominant party definition (Proposition 2.7). But Pempel's requirements for a dominant party are stronger because of (C3) and (C4), which are beyond the scope of the current work. Therefore Pempel's notion can be interpreted as a special case of the concept of this paper.
It should be emphasized that in this work parties' ideological stances are not taken into account. A coalition is defined as winning if it has a majority of seats. Obviously, in reality some majority coalitions cannot occur because of ideological differences between its members. The definition of dominant party I use here holds for the general class of simple monotonic games, but in examining its empirical application I chose "objective", technical data only and ignore ideological issues which can be interpreted subjectively.
Moreover, I assume that there are no dependencies between different election outcomes. A more complicated model, where election outcome depends on the previous election, is left for the further research.
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For n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, . . . , n} be the set of parties.
Definition 2.1. A simple game is an ordered pair G = ([n], W ), where n ∈ N, [n] is the set of players and W is a set of coalitions (subsets of [n]) whose members are in the winning coalition. G is monotonic if
The special interest in this paper is the class of monotonic simple games named "weighted majority games".
be the vector of weights given to the parties. Let 0 < q < i∈[n] w i be the majority quota.
A weighted majority game G([n], w, q) = ([n], W (w, q)) is a simple game defined by:
Hereafter I assume a simple majority, namely, q = i∈[n] w i 2
. Note that for this majority quota the weighted majority game G([n], w, q) is proper. Denote
The following result is due to Peleg [1981] :
. In a properly weighted majority game G([n], w, q * (n, w)) there is at most one dominant player. If it exists, it is player i which has the largest weight w i .
Since the current paper is devoted to an application of this theory to parliaments, in this paper the terms "player" and "party" are equivalent.
Definition 2.8. Let G(N, w, q) be a weighted majority game. Player (party) i is a
Note that a dictator is a special case of a dominant party. Denote by ∆(P) the number of weighted majority games corresponding to members of P with a dominant player. Namely,
there is a dominant player}| I use the following statistical test to show that ∆(P) is significantly higher than if weights of the weighted majority game were randomly allocated with uniform distribution.
Suppose that in each election weights are randomly allocated to parties according to some unknown distribution. Namely, for each m ∈ [M ], P m is a realization of this random allocation. Let π DOM (m) be the probability that in the mth election outcome, For n ∈ N, let Ω(n) = {(w 1 , . . . , w n )| n i=1 w i = 1} be the (n − 1)−dimensional simplex. Let vector w be picked from Ω(n) with uniform distribution. I define then π DOM (n) as the probability that in game G([n], w, q * ([n], w)) there is a dominant player.
Formally, denote
when w ∈ Ω(n) is drawn with uniform distribution.
The following hypotheses about P are to be tested:
be the vector that defines a sequence of M independent Bernoulli trials, when
is the parameter of the mth trial, m ∈ [M ]. Denote by X(π DOM (Λ)) a random variable of the number of successes in M independent Bernoulli trials with parameters given by
(H0 DOM ) will be rejected and (H1 DOM ) will be accepted if P rob(X(π DOM (Λ)) ≥ ∆(P)) < 0.05. I proceed next to estimate P rob(X(π DOM (Λ)) ≥ ∆(P)). By the Central Limit Theorem,
where
and N (1, 0) is the standard normal distribution.
(3.1) is used to estimate P rob(X(π DOM (Λ)) ≥ ∆(P)).
Let P be the set of real-data election outcomes (for the data description see Appendix 1. For its summary see Appendix 2, Table 5 ). In this case, M = 336 and ∆(P) = 257.
Estimations for π DOM (n), π DIC (n), n = 1, . . . , 17 are summarized in Appendix 2, Table   5 .
Using (3.2) and (3.3):
) is the number of successes after M independent Bernoulli trials with parameters π DOM (Λ). After substitution of (3.4) and (3.5) into (3.1):
According to these findings hypothesis (H0 DOM ) is rejected and (H1 DOM ) is accepted.
Similarly, denote by δ(P) the number of games with a dictator among the weighted majority games corresponding to P. Formally,
Let π DIC (m) be the probability that in the mth election outcome,
there is a dictator. The existence of a dictator in G([Λ(m)], P m , q * (Λ(m), P m )) is the success in the Bernoulli trial with parameter π DIC (m). After M trials with parameters π DIC (1), . . . , π DIC (M ), the observed number of successes is δ(P).
Denote Ω DIC (n) = {w ∈ Ω| in the game G([n], w, q * (n, w)) there is a dictator},
Denote by Y (π DIC (Λ)) the random number of successes in M independent Bernoulli trials with parameters given by π DIC (Λ) .
(H0 DIC ) will be rejected and (H1 DIC ) will be accepted if P rob(Y (π DIC (Λ)) ≤ ∆(P)) < 0.05.
. By the Central Limit Theorem,
As above, N (1, 0) is the standard normal distribution.
Let P be the set of real-data election outcomes (for the data description see Appendix 1. For its summary see Appendix 2, Table 5 ). In this case, M = 336 and δ(P) = 32.
Estimations for π DIC (n), n = 1, . . . , 17 are summarized in Appendix 2, Table 5 .
Using (3.7) and (3.8) :
) is the number of successes after M independent Bernoulli trials
After substitution of (3.9) and (3.10) into (3.6):
According to these findings hypothesis H0 DIC is rejected and H1 DIC is accepted.
Dominant player and cabinet coalition formation
In this section I extend the empirical findings based on Peleg [1980 Peleg [ , 1981 . I use a statistical test akin to the one used by de Swaan [1973] and Chua and Felsenthal [2008] .
Below is its description.
Consider an allocation of seats in a parliament, such that a dominant, non-dictator party exists. Suppose that this dominant party is appointed by the Head of State to form the cabinet coalition. Suppose that a majority coalition is built. In this section I examine whether the dominant party will "use the advantage" it has and form a coalition that it dominates.
Let us consider M coalitions. Let Λ ∈ N M , Λ (i) be the number of parties represented in parliament for each coalition 1 ≤ i ≤ M .
be the distribution of seats in parliament for coalition
. Requirements from C, V are that:
1. There is a dominant player in the game
, and this player belongs to C(i) (and it forms the coalition).
C(i) is the winning coalition in game
3. There is no dictator in game
Denote by D(C) the number of coalitions C(1), . . . , C(M ), which are dominated by
. Denote:
Let π C be a vector defined by:
. Suppose that in the ith parliament the party J (i) is chosen to form a government coalition, and it forms a winning coalition in the game
where J (i) is included. Let π C (i) be the probability that the coalition formed will be dominated by
I now formulate the hypotheses:
I use a statistical test similar to the one used in Section 3.
Consider M Bernoulli trials with parameters π C (1), . . . , π C (M ). Let Z(π C ) be a random variable of the number of successes in these trials. The hypothesis (H0 COAL ) will be rejected and the hypothesis (H1 COAL ) will be accepted if
For the data used (see Appendix 1 for a description),
Therefore, hypothesis (H0 COAL ) must be rejected and (H1 COAL ) is accepted. Results of the regression model estimation are given in There is only one observation where the number of parties is 17 (the maximal number of parties in the dataset). It can be referred to as an extreme observation. If it is excluded from the analysis, the results of the estimation of the quadratic probit regression model become less significant (see Table 2 ). 1920 -1930 ,1945 -2009 Belgium 1900 -1939 ,1946 -1965 Denmark 1920 Federal Republic of Germany 1949 -2009 Finland 1907 -1939 ,1945 -2007 Iceland 1959 -2009 Israel 1949 -2009 Italy 1946 Luxembourg 1919 -1937 ,1945 -2009 Netherlands 1918 -1937 ,1946 -2010 Norway 1921 -1936 ,1945 -2009 Portugal 1975 -2009 Sweden 1908 -2010 Switzerland 1919 -2007 Weimar Republic 1919 -1933 and Poguntke [2010] .
The data for Israel is from the official Knesset (parliament of Israel) website (www.knesset.gov.il). 
